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Philosophy and Theology
Philosophers and theologians have devoted increasing attention to parenthood. One
topic of interest is the relationship between parental rights and parental duties. In
her article, “Adoption Is Not Abortion-Lite,” Lindsey Porter writes, “A proprietary
theory of parenthood might succeed in explaining parental rights. After all, to
own a thing is just to have a unique and robust right to it. But it’s clear that such
an account will do little to explain parental obligation: if I own my car, it’s clearer
that I have a right to cut it in half than that I have an obligation to care for it” (Journal of Applied Philosophy, February 2012). This account gets things backwards.
It is not that parental rights explain parental duties but rather that parental duties
explain parental rights. The primary and fundamental obligation of parents to care
for their dependent vulnerable children grounds the particular prerogatives (rights)
that parents have over their children. Parents cannot properly care for their children
unless they can control the lives of their children in appropriate ways. The parental
duty to care gives rise to parental rights. Porter continues, “Michael Austin gives
a thorough discussion of these sorts of accounts in his Conceptions of Parenthood,
and points out, additionally, that children are probably not the sorts of entities that
can be owned. I don’t find his argument for the moral status of babies particularly
compelling; but it seems quite obvious that persons can’t be owned, and usually,
babies turn into persons—and persons with parents, at that. So, even if babies can be
owned, children probably can’t be.” Children probably can’t be owned? It is startling
to find the sentence so qualified. Porter opens the door to what amounts to slavery:
ownership of human beings. In the quixotic quest to rationally justify abortion, a
background belief animating Porter’s discussion, even slavery of a certain class of
human beings becomes a debatable issue.
Another issue concerning parenthood is explored by Bernard Prusak in “What
Are Parents For?” Prusak offers reasons why conceiving a child precisely in order
to place the child for adoption is morally problematic (Hastings Center Report,
March–April 2010). Although he does not explicitly cite Donum vitae’s argument
that a child has the right to integrative parenthood, Prusak echoes this argument in
other, persuasive, terms:
© 2012 The National Catholic Bioethics Center
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Whilemakinganadoptionplanisjustifiablewhen,duringapregnancy,parentsrealizethattheycannotprovideforthechildastheyareobligedtodo,to
seek to conceive a child with the idea of giving him or her up is wrong since
itfloutsthespecialimperfectobligationthataparenthastowardhisorher
child to seek to make his or her life good in ways that only a parent can. More
simply, to seek to conceive a child with the idea of giving him or her up is to
fail to take seriously the obligation that a parent has to love his or her child in
ways that only a parent can be expected to do. And so it should not be done.

This sounds right. However, elsewhere in the article, Prusak objects to the idea of
the child’s right to be loved, an idea defended by S. Matthew Liao in a 2006 article
titled, “The Right of Children to Be Loved.” 1 Prusak writes, “It cannot plausibly
be claimed that a child has a right to be loved by his or her parents; this way of
talking just does not make sense. (Imagine a child seeking a lawyer to bring his or
her parents to court on the charge that they just do not love her.) The obligation in
question is then an imperfect obligation, using this term in contrast to a perfect obligation to mark the distinction between obligations with counterpart rights (namely,
perfect obligations) and obligations without counterpart rights (namely, imperfect
obligations).”Thispassageisratherconfusedinpartbecause“love”isnotdefined.
If we understand “love” as the choice to will what is good for another, then parents
do indeed have legal obligations to love their children, to provide various goods for
them such as food, clothing, and shelter. With the help of an attorney, a child could
indeed force his or her negligent parents to do their duty and love him or her in the
sense of providing necessities.
Prusak provides another argument against children having a right to be loved,
I disagree, then, with Liao’s argument in “The Right of Children to Be Loved”
seeking to vindicate this right, found in some international declarations, from
the charge that it is merely a so-called manifesto right. Liao claims 1) that
“human beings have rights to those conditions that are primary essential for a
good life”; 2) that “being loved is primary essential for children to have a good
life” as human beings (for which he provides much important documentation);
and so 3) that, “therefore, children have a right to be loved” (422). To which
itmightbecountered:thefirstpremiseisfalse.Tobeginwith,wouldLiao
wanttoclaimthatthereisarighttohealth?Forhealth,too,canbedescribed
as a condition “essential for a good life.” Also, to proclaim a universal right
toagood,withoutregardtowhetherthereisaspecifiableobligation-holder,
is to cheapen the language of rights. In such circumstances, nothing can be
claimed against anybody. For example, does an orphan have a right to be
loved?Ifso,againstwhomdoestheorphanholdthisright?

ThiscritiqueofLiaodoesnotstanduptoscrutiny.Istherearighttohealth?Prusak
asserts,withoutargument,thatthereisnosuchthingwithoutevendefiningwhatthe
right to health might be. It could be that there is a “right to health,” which is similar
to the right to life. Just as people have a duty to not intentionally take the life of an
innocent person (and this is what is meant by the “right to life”) so, too, people have
a duty to not intentionally harm the health of innocent people. Although we do not
often speak in this way, the duty to not intentionally harm the health of others may
See S. Matthew Liao, “The Right of Children to Be Loved,” Journal of Political
Philosophy14.4(2006):420–440.
1
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be called the “right to health.” Nature may impede someone’s life or health, but the
rights to life and health provide a kind of moral immunity, protecting each of us
from intentional harm by others.
Thecaseof theorphandoesnotposeaproblemforthechild’srighttobeloved
if we understand the right to be loved as the duty of the parents to love. The right
to be loved may be something like the right to inherit property from one’s parents.
If one’s parents have no property, then one will not get property even though one
retains a right to inherit property. Similarly, children retain the right to be loved,
even if their parents are dead and so cannot provide love.2
In their article, “Better Not to Have Children,” Gerald Harrison and Julia Tanner
defendaviewthatisbecomingincreasinglyprominent:that“itisbothwrongand
unwise to procreate” (Think,2011).Thefirstargumentthattheygiveintheirdefense
of sterility is that procreation is bad for others in virtue of the environmental destruction that human beings cause around the planet.
This argument is certainly too broad. Some human beings do indeed trash the
planet, but some human beings do not harm the planet, while other human beings
positively help the environment. Among those who do not harm the environment
are indigenous tribal peoples who live low-consumption lifestyles. Among those
who positively enhance the environment are the scientists working on ways to
reduce pollution and the technological innovators working on ways to develop clean
energysources.Humansbeingscanevenhelpfixenvironmentaldamagecausedby
non-humanbeings,aswhenaforestfirestartedbylighteningthreatenstodestroy
anaturalhabitatbutisputoutbyfirefighters.Theimplicitgeneralizationonwhich
Harrison and Tanner’s argument rests, that procreation is always bad for others in
virtue of the environmental destruction, is false.
Next, Harrison and Tanner argue that “it is questionable whether existence is, in
general,abenefittotheexister:itmaybemoreofaburdenthanaboon.Granted,ifyou
ask them, most people will say their lives are worth living (in fact, most people will
say their lives are going better than most people’s!). But there are powerful psychological factors at play here. Our self assessments of well-being are known to be heavily
biased towards the positive.” Thus, according to Harrison and Tanner, since living
is a burden, and procreators cause people to live, procreators burden other people.
Since the vast majority of people prefer living over dying, Harrison and Tanner
rejectpreferencesatisfactionasabasisfordeterminingbenefitsandburdens.There
is another reason that they need to reject preference satisfaction in order to make
theircaseforitbeingbettertobebarren.AsW.BradfordWilcoxandElizabeth
Marquardt point out, the vast majority of people prefer having children over being
sterile:“Infact,inthe2010GeneralSocialSurvey,only2percentofyoungadults
reported that they thought that having no children was ideal for a family (and only
18 percent of middle-aged women today are childless).” 3 So, Harrison and Tanner’s

For a further article of interest on this topic, see S. Matthew Liao, “Parental Love
Pills:SomeEthicalConsiderations,”Bioethics25.9(November2011):489–494.
3
W. Bradford Wilcox and Elizabeth Marquardt, When Baby Makes Three: How
Parenthood Makes Life Meaningful and How Marriage Makes Parenthood Bearable (New
York:InstituteforAmericanValues,2012),12.
2
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ethical judgment that it is wrong to have children must rest on some other foundation
than preference satisfaction, but it is not clear what that foundation is.
They speak about “benefits outweighing burdens” but fail to provide any
objectivebasisforwhatcountsasabenefitorwhatcountsasaburdenorwhatan
acceptableratioofbenefitsandburdenswouldtobe.HarrisonandTannerwrite,
“Evenifbenefitsoutweighburdenswithinalife,there’snoescapingthefactwe
die. Most agree that our own deaths harm us greatly (not the Epicureans). They
endourlives—livesthatwehavebecomeinvestedin,thatwe’dverymuchliketo
continue. These sorts of considerations make it uncomfortably plausible that it may
be better never to have lived at all, than to have lived and died.” It is inconsistent
forHarrisonandTannertofirstrejectpreferencesatisfactionwhenitcomestowhy
having children is good or why existing is desirable and then invoke preference
satisfaction to establish the harm of death as part of the burden of living. Further,
unlesslifeitselfisabenefit,eitherasanintrinsicgoodoratleastasanecessary
condition for enjoying some things (perhaps pleasant mental experiences) that are
considered intrinsically good, then it is hard to see why death would be a negative.
But if death is not a burden, then it should not count negatively in our assessment
of whether it would have been better never to have lived at all, than to have lived
and died. Harrison and Tanner’s assessment is also confused since it is impossible
to compare the state of “never having lived” to the state of living and then dying,
since “never having lived” is not a state at all but a lack of having had a condition.
Prior to his or her existence, a person is in no condition at all, so comparisons of a
person prior to existence with an existing person do not make sense.
In mounting their case against procreation, Harrison and Tanner point out that
childrendonotconsenttoexisting:“Buteveniflifeisbeneficialoverall,itdoesn’t
follow that it was permissible to subject someone to it. Children often, resentfully, point
outtotheirparentsthat‘theydidn’tchoosetobeborn’.Theyhaveapoint.Ordinarily it is wrong to subject someone to something; ordinarily we must gain someone’s
consentbeforedoingsomethingthatwillsignificantlyaffectthem.Tosubjectsomeone
toalifeistosignificantlyaffectthemwithouttheirpriorconsent.”Putinsyllogistic
form, Harrison and Tanner argue that it is wrong to subject someone to something
without his or her consent; to bring a child into existence is to subject someone to
something without his or her consent, so it is wrong to bring a child into existence.
Both premises of their argument are false. True, children did not consent to
existing, but in procreating a child, parents do not violate the principle that “it is
wrong to subject someone to something,” since the person allegedly violated was not
in existence prior to his or her conception and so could not be subjected to anything.
Prior to coming into existence, no subject can be violated. Furthermore, the minor
premise is undermined by various counterexamples. Parents regularly subject their
own children to many things, not only without the children’s informed consent (such
as the feeding of babies) but sometimes also against the children’s consent (such as
vaccinations and compulsory schooling). Not only do the parents do no wrong in
such matters but they have a positive duty to act without the consent of their children
and sometimes against the wishes of their children.
Last,HarrisonandTannerarguethathavingchildrenmakeparentsunhappy:
“The evidence is, the more children you have the more unhappy you are likely to
be. . . . Happiness levels only start going back up after the last child leaves home.” This
argumentfails,bothconceptuallyandempirically.Conceptually,withoutdefining
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happiness we cannot offer a reasonable answer to the question of whether happiness typically increases, decreases, or remains static with children. Let us consider
only three options, excluding, for reasons mentioned, preference satisfaction as a
possibility.Ifonedefineshappinessintermsofbodilypleasure,itisindeedhardto
seehowhavingchildrenwouldcontribute.Ifonedefineshappinessasmeaningful
achievement, then it is important to note that “husbands and wives who have childrenaresignificantlymorelikelytoreportthattheir‘lifehasanimportantpurpose,’
compared to their childless peers.” 4Ifonedefineshappinessasactivityinaccordance
with virtue, then children will bring happiness only for people of good character. If
Aristotleisright,onlythevirtuouswillenjoydifficultbutvirtuousactivity,suchas
raising children. People lacking virtue will derive neither pleasure nor satisfaction
fromsuchdifficultactivity.
Empirically, Harrison and Tanner’s argument is weak because it relies on
dated data. They cite Daniel Gilbert’s Stumbling on Happiness, which relies on a
1977 study that suggests that children and happiness are inversely related.5 More
recent data, provided in 2012 by the National Marriage Project, portrays a differentpicture:“AccordingtotheSurveyofMaritalGenerosity,thehappiesthusbands
and wives among today’s young couples are those with no children and those with
four or more children. . . . This means that the parents of large families are at least
40 percent more likely to be happily married than the parents of smaller families.” 6
It is not true that the more children you have the more unhappy you are likely to be.
Finally, Harrison and Tanner’s thesis that it is wrong and unwise to procreate
overlookswhatchildrengivetoparents.Childrenenableparentstorealizethedrive
of erotic love toward unity. In having children, parents are united physically in the
very DNA of their children. Normally, parents are also united in affection through
loving their children and united emotionally by sharing in the joys and sufferings
of their children.7 Children strengthen a marital friendship of virtue by providing
ample opportunities for virtuous acts that strengthen the character of the parents.
From a Christian perspective, children also provide built-in opportunities for the
parents to perform countless corporal and spiritual works of mercy. 8 For reasons such
as these, the Second Vatican Council taught that “children are really the supreme
gift of marriage and contribute very substantially to the welfare of their parents.” 9
c hr isTopher k Aczor

Ibid., 4.
Daniel Gilbert, Stumbling on Happiness(London:HarperPress,2006).
6
Wilcox and Marquardt, When Baby Makes Three, 50, original emphasis.
7
Formoreontherelationshipofprocreationanderos,seeChristopherKaczor,“Being
inLoveandBegettingaChild:AGreekMythofErosandtheChristianMysteryofMarriage”
in Sexuality and the U.S. Catholic Church: Crisis and Renewal, ed. Lisa Sowle Cahill, John
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Love and Procreation.”
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